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Self-Selection and the Efficiency of Tournaments 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
The literature has shown that the overall efficiency of exogenously imposed tournaments is 
reduced by a high variance in performance.  This paper reports results from an experiment 
analyzing whether allowing subjects to self-select into different payment schemes is reducing 
the variability of performance in tournaments.  We show that when the subjects choose to 
enter a tournament instead of a piece-rate payment scheme, the average effort is higher and the 
between-subject variance is substantially lower than when the same payment scheme is 
imposed.  Mainly based on risk aversion, sorting is efficiency-enhancing since it increases the 
homogeneity of the contestants.  
 
 
Tor Eriksson (Aarhus School of Business, Aarhus University, Denmark)
 
Sabrina Teyssier (GATE, University of Lyon, France) 
Marie-Claire Villeval  (CNRS, GATE, France, and IZA, Bonn, Germany) 
 
 
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The use of promotion tournaments is fairly widespread especially in the higher ranks of firms 
and organizations.  The incentive property of tournaments has been studied early and 
extensively in the theoretical literature by Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983), 
Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), O'Keeffe, Viscusi, and Zeckhauser (1984); for a survey see 
McLaughlin (1988). The empirical studies, based on survey or experimental data, are fewer 
and many survey analyses use sports rather than business data (Prendergast 1999). These 
studies have confirmed that the efficiency of tournaments depends on the spread between the 
winner’s and the loser’s prizes, the number of prizes at stake, the size of the tournament, and 
the degree of uncertainty faced by the employees.
i
 
However, both theoretical models and empirical studies also point to some factors that limit 
the incentive effect of tournaments, such as collusion among employees or employees 
sabotaging each other, as studied by Lazear (1989) in a theoretical analysis and experimentally 
by Harbring and Irlenbusch (2005).  More generally, most laboratory experiments have 
provided evidence of tournaments being associated with a high variance in effort [see in 
particular Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003), van Dijk, 
Sonnemans, and van Winden (2001)].  This variance of effort, which is found to be larger in 
tournaments than in an equivalent piece-rate scheme, reduces the overall efficiency of 
tournaments. 
The principal aim of this paper is to show that previous experimental evidence regarding the 
variability of effort in tournaments is misleading because the experiments have not accounted 
for sorting, that is, that agents typically choose to participate in a tournament.  The large 
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variability observed in earlier studies is explained by Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) by the 
game nature of the tournament, which requires the agents to elaborate a strategy that is more 
cognitively demanding than the maximizing behavior required by a piece-rate system.  Indeed, 
in addition to the stochastic technology of production, the agents have to cope with strategic 
uncertainty.  Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) show that the variance of effort diminishes 
when the strategic uncertainty is reduced, for example when the subjects know they are faced 
with automatons that always select the same level of effort that is also common knowledge.  
The variance remains high, however, indicating that the discontinuities in the payoff functions 
themselves contribute to the difficulty of the maximization program and to the high variance 
of effort.  More recent papers, such as Vandegrift and Brown (2003), have shown that the use 
of high-variance strategies may be related to both the difficulty of the task and the ability of 
the individuals.   The hypothesis that we test in this paper is that the variability of effort may 
be reduced – and thus the efficiency of tournament increased - by allowing people to choose 
their payment scheme, i.e., providing them with a choice to enter the competition or not.  
More precisely, we suggest that the observed high variance of effort may be due to the fact 
that in previous experiments a competitive payment scheme is imposed on very risk averse or 
under-confident subjects.  For example, facing uncertainty, some of the subjects drop out, i.e., 
they choose the minimum effort, securing the loser’s prize without bearing any cost of effort, 
whereas others choose the maximum effort, securing the winner’s prize but at an inefficiently 
high cost of effort.  Had the subjects been given the choice, like in flexible labor markets 
where people can choose to enter or shy away from competitive occupations, very risk averse 
subjects would probably not have entered the competition and the overall variance of effort 
would be lower. 
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By testing whether the performance variability is reduced by the ex ante sorting effect of 
tournaments, our paper contributes to a very recent literature about the importance of both 
incentive and sorting effects in the determination of payment schemes’ efficiency, initiated by 
Lazear (2000).
ii
  This literature shows that sorting influences economic behavior.  Earlier, the 
sorting function of tournaments has mainly been documented with respect to their ability to 
select ex post the best performers.  However, their ex ante sorting effect is considerably less 
studied and none of the previous empirical studies have been concerned with the impact of ex 
ante sorting on the variability of performance.
iii
  
To study the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments and its impact on the variability of effort, 
we have designed a laboratory experiment based on the comparison between a Benchmark 
treatment and a Choice treatment, and involving 120 student-subjects.  In the Benchmark 
treatment, half of the subjects are paid according to a piece-rate payment scheme and the other 
half enters pair-wise tournaments.  This treatment consists of a one-stage game in which the 
subjects choose their level of effort knowing their payment scheme and the uncertainty of the 
environment.  We find, in line with earlier experiments, that in this treatment, the variance of 
effort is substantially higher in the tournament than in the piece-rate payment scheme.  In the 
Choice treatment, we add a preliminary stage in which the subjects choose between a piece-
rate scheme and a tournament.  Those who choose the tournament are paired together.  In the 
second stage, each subject decides on his level of effort.  In both treatments, the individual 
outcome depends on both the effort level and an i.i.d. random shock.  The difference between 
the two payment schemes emanates from the strategic uncertainty associated with the 
tournament setting.  
By comparing the subjects’ behavior in the two treatments, we can identify the impact of 
sorting on the average level and the variance of effort.  We also seek to identify determinants 
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of self-selection.  The equilibrium effort level is higher in the tournament than under the piece-
rate scheme but the expected utility of both compensation schemes is the same.  Hence, risk-
neutral subjects should be indifferent between the two schemes.  For their part, risk averse 
subjects can adopt a less risky scheme by choosing the piece-rate scheme.  We measure the 
subjects’ risk aversion by using the lottery procedure proposed by Holt and Laury  (2002). 
Our experiment delivers three main findings.  First, the key novel finding is that the 
employees’ choice of pay schemes contributes to a considerable reduction in the variance of 
effort among contestants in the tournament.  This result is confirmed by a robustness test in 
which the subjects are only allowed to choose their payment scheme in the first period of the 
game and for its whole duration.  Second, the average effort is higher when the subjects can 
select their payment scheme in each period, which suggests that the sorting effect reinforces 
the incentive effect of both tournaments and variable pay schemes.  Third, the subjects self 
select according to their degree of risk aversion.  A cluster analysis identifies a category of 
under-confident subjects and a category of hesitant ones who both tend to shy away from 
competition when they can choose their payment scheme.  The resulting greater homogeneity 
of contestants improves the overall efficiency of tournaments.  We conclude that in order to 
understand the origin of the high variance of effort in tournaments, and more generally, the 
efficiency of a payment scheme, recognition of heterogeneity of preferences is key. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the theoretical 
framework and the experimental design.  Section 3 gives the experimental procedures.   
Section 4 describes and analyzes the experimental evidence.  Section 5 discusses the results 
and concludes.  
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II. THEORY AND EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
The model 
Consider an economy with identical, risk-neutral agents. Agent i has the following utility 
function, separable in payment and in effort:  
 
U
i
e
i  u pi  c ei                         (1) 
with u(pi) concave and c(ei) convex. 
The production technology is stochastic and output is increasing in the agent’s 
effort:
 
y
i
 f e
i  i                           (2)    
with f(ei) = ei for the sake of simplicity and εi is an i.i.d. random shock distributed over the 
interval [-z, +z].  Only individual outcomes are observable; individual effort is not observable, 
neither by the principal nor the other agents.  The cost function is increasing and 
convex
 
c e
i  ei
2 / s                                                                      (3)  
with s > 0, c(0) = 0, c’(ei) > 0 and c”(ei) > 0.
iv
 
In the labor market, some firms pay the agents a piece-rate compensation scheme and other 
firms use tournaments.  If there is a perfect mobility in the labor market at no cost, in the first 
stage the agents choose their firm (i.e. their payment scheme) and, in the second stage, they 
decide on their level of effort.  Let us first solve the equilibrium effort levels under each mode. 
In the piece-rate system, the agent’s payment depends only on his own outcome.  The payment 
consists of a fixed wage, denoted by a, corresponding to an input-based payment and a linear 
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piece-rate, denoted by b, corresponding to an output-based payment.  Under this compensation 
scheme, the agent’s utility function becomes: 
 
U
i
PR(e
i
)  a  b.y
i
 e
i
2 / s                                     (4)  
 The first order condition is: 
 
U
i
PR / e
i
 b c ' e
i  0  
Thus, the equilibrium effort of each agent under the piece-rate payment scheme depends 
positively on the incentive, b, as well as the cost scaling factor, s: 
 e
PR*  b.s / 2                                       (5) 
In the firms practicing tournaments, the agents play a non-cooperative game with incomplete 
information like in Lazear and Rosen (1981).  In pair-wise tournaments, two prizes are 
distributed: W is the winner’s prize allocated to the agent whose outcome is the highest and L 
is the loser’s prize, allocated to the other agent, with W > L.  The magnitude of the difference 
between the two outcomes does not affect the determination of the winner of the tournament. 
The agent’s utility is: 
 
U
i
T e
i
,e
j 
W  c e
i  if yi  y j
L  c e
i  if yi  y j




                                                                  (6)  
The agents being symmetric, the probability to win the tournament, pr(ei,ej), reduces to the 
probability that the difference in individual random terms exceeds the difference between 
individual effort levels:
 
pr e
i
,e
j  pr i   j  e j  ei .  Agent i’s expected utility of the 
tournament is: 
 
EU
i
T e
i
,e
j  L  pr ei ,e j . W  L    ei
2 / s            (7) 
The maximization program yields the following first order condition: 
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EU
i
T e
i
,e
j / ei   pr ei ,e j / ei W  L  2ei / s  0                                                      (8)                                          
We obtain a pure symmetric Nash equilibrium, where effort increases with the prize spread 
and decreases with both the cost of effort and the size of the shock distribution: 
 
e
i
T *  e
j
T *  W  L .s / 4z               (9)   
Having determined the equilibrium effort level under each payment scheme, we now turn to 
the first stage problem.  The agent chooses his firm by comparing his expected utility under 
each payment scheme.  He is thus indifferent between the two schemes when: 
 
0.5(W  L)  [ W  L .s] / 4z 
2
/ s  a  (b2.s) / 2  (b.s) / 2 
2
/ s       (10) 
For equation (10) to hold, the expected utility of the tournament must increase as the fixed 
payment, a, and the variable payment, b, in the piece-rate scheme increase, other things equal.  
It must decrease when s decreases, i.e., when the marginal cost of effort increases.  Indeed, if 
the marginal cost of effort decreases, with more equilibrium effort, utility from the tournament 
decreases and compensation with a piece-rate rises faster than the cost of effort, and 
consequently, the utility from the piece-rate increases.  Moreover, a simple comparative-static 
exercise shows that the tournament should be preferred to the piece-rate scheme if the loser’s 
prize, L, increases, ceteris paribus, or as the variance of the random term becomes large. 
   
The experimental design 
The instructions have been kept as close as possible to Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) (see 
Appendix). 
Two treatments. In the Benchmark treatment, after being informed of their compensation 
schemes, and knowing the cost of each effort level and the distribution of the random term, the 
subjects have to choose their level of effort. An important difference from the set-up in Bull et 
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al. (1987) is that in a session, half of the subjects are exogenously and randomly attributed a 
piece-rate payment scheme and the other half a tournament scheme. The proportion is 
unknown to the subjects but they are aware of the coexistence of two modes of payment.  In 
contrast, Bull et al. (1987) organized separate sessions in which players were paid either a 
piece-rate or according to a tournament.  Our motivation was to keep the social environment 
comparable with that of the Choice Treatment in which both schemes coexist in the same 
session in unknown proportions.  The game is repeated 20 times. 
The Choice treatment is similar to the Benchmark except that in the first stage of each period, 
the subjects choose to be paid according to either a piece-rate scheme or a tournament scheme.  
Those who have opted for the tournament are pooled together and paired.  In case of an 
uneven number of contestants, one subject is randomly chosen and paid according to a piece-
rate scheme; he is informed of this before deciding on his level of effort.  There is no mobility 
cost, i.e., the subjects are free to move to the other payment scheme in each new period at no 
cost.  In the second stage of the game, the subjects choose their level of effort. 
The design of the game enables between-subject but not within-subject comparisons since 
each treatment is played by different subjects.  The latter would have required submitting all 
the subjects to the exogenous piece-rate scheme, next to an exogenous tournament, and then to 
the choice treatment.  It would then have become necessary to alternate between the various 
treatments to control for potential order effects within the Benchmark and between the 
Benchmark and the Choice treatments.  Our design is simpler and allows the subjects to play 
more repetitions of a same treatment.
v
 
Matching protocol. Unlike in most experiments on tournaments, we adopt a stranger matching 
protocol.  This is motivated by the constraint of the Choice treatment: if we had used a partner 
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matching protocol, a subject who is willing to choose the tournament but is paired with a 
person who always chooses the piece-rate, would be prevented from competing throughout the 
game.  A consequence of our matching protocol is, however, that we reinforce the complexity 
of the tournament game due to conjectural variations, making it harder to make inferences 
about the opponent’s behavior.  Could the use of a random matching process have an impact 
on the variance of effort?  On the one hand, if errors in inferences were the source of the 
greater variability of effort in tournaments, this should entail a greater variability of effort in 
our design than in games with fixed pairs.  On the other hand, if using a random matching 
hinders within-pair coordination on either a minimum effort or a maximum effort, this may 
result in a lower between-group variance of effort than when pairs are fixed.  We can, 
however, disregard both effects; in addition, this should not affect the comparison between 
treatments since both have been conducted with the same matching protocol.
 vi
 
Parameters. Effort can take any integer value in the set:
 
e
i
 0,1,...,100 . In the cost function, 
s = 150, so that
 
c e
i  ei
2 / 150 .  The random shocks vary in the interval [-40,+40].  In the 
tournament, the winner’s prize has been set at W = 96 and the loser’s prize at L = 45.  In the 
piece-rate scheme, the fixed wage, a, amounts to 45 and the piece-rate, b, is equal to 0.52, 
meaning that each unit of outcome gives 0.52 to the agent.  These values ensure that the 
certain payment is the same under both schemes.  Without such a fixed wage equal to the 
loser’s prize, it could be rational for a risk-averse agent to choose the tournament and a 
minimum effort in order not to bear the consequences of a negative random shock on wages 
under a purely linear piece-rate scheme.  Therefore, with our design, only the strategic 
uncertainty makes a difference between the two schemes. 
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Given these values, and assuming the agents to be risk neutral and rational, those who are paid 
according to a piece-rate scheme should provide the effort ei
PR*
 = 39, according to equation 
(5); those who enter the tournament should provide the effort ei
T*
 = 48, according to the pure 
strategy Nash equilibrium in equation (9).  The players should be indifferent between the two 
payment schemes since the expected utility of both is the same (EUi
PR 
= EUi
T
 = 55), but they 
have to work harder if they choose the tournament.  
Elicitation of risk aversion. The above predictions hold for risk-neutral subjects.  One would 
expect that risk averse subjects i) reduce their effort level under each mode of payment when 
this is exogeneous, and ii) are more likely to stay out of the tournament to avoid the strategic 
uncertainty due to competition.  To elicit the risk aversion of the subjects, we used the lottery 
procedure proposed by Holt and Laury  (2002).  
At the end of the sessions (in order not to influence the game), the subjects filled out a 
questionnaire with 10 decisions (see the instructions in Appendix).  Each decision consists of a 
choice between two paired lotteries, “option A” and “option B”.  The payoffs for options A are 
either €2 or €1.60, whereas the riskier options B pay either €3.85 or €0.10.  In the first 
decision, the probability of the high payoff for both options is 1/10.  In the second decision the 
probability increases to 2/10.  Similarly, the chance of receiving the high payoff for each 
decision increases as the number of the decision increases.  When the probability of the higher 
payoff is large enough, subjects should cross over from option A to option B. Risk neutrality 
corresponds to a switch at the fifth decision, while risk loving subjects are expected to move 
earlier and risk averse subjects as from the sixth decision.  The subjects made 10 decisions but 
only one was selected at random for payment. 
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III. EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES 
The experiments have been conducted at the GATE laboratory, Lyon, France.  The experiment 
was computerized, using the REGATE software designed by Zeiliger (2000).  We recruited 
120 under-graduate students from three business or engineering schools, trying to guarantee a 
fair gender distribution in each session (45,83 per cent of male participants in total).  Six 
sessions with 20 subjects in each were organized; 3 for the Benchmark treatment and 3 for the 
Choice treatment.  Thanks to the 20 repetitions of the game, we collected a total of 2400 
observations. 
Upon arrival, each subject was randomly assigned a computer.  Instructions were distributed 
and read aloud.  Attached to the instructions was a sheet displaying the decision costs 
associated with each possible effort from 0 to 100.  Questions were answered in private.  The 
participants had had to answer a series of questions about the computation of payoffs under 
each payment scheme.  The experiment started once all the participants answered correctly.  
No communication was allowed.  
In the Benchmark treatment, at the beginning of the session and for its whole duration 10 
subjects were attributed the piece-rate scheme and 10 the tournament scheme.  In the Choice 
treatment, in each period they had to tick either the “mode X” (piece-rate) box or the “mode 
Y” (tournament) box to choose their payment scheme for the current period.  In both 
treatments, they selected their effort (“decision number”) by means of a scrollbar.  This being 
done, they had to click a button to generate their “personal random number” that was added to 
their effort choice to constitute their individual outcome (‘result”).  Under the tournament 
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scheme, the computer program compared the outcomes of the two contestants in each pair and 
determined who was to receive the winner’s prize (“the fixed payment M”) and who to get the 
loser’s prize (“the fixed payment L”).  In case of a tie, a fair random draw determined the 
allocation of prizes among the pair members.  At the end of the period, each subject received a 
feedback on his payoff and in case of a tournament, on the difference between his outcome 
and his competitor’s outcome.  In each new period, the pairs involved in a tournament were 
randomly reconstituted. 
After the completion of the 20 periods, the risk aversion post-experimental questionnaire was 
distributed and read aloud.  Subjects noted on a sheet of paper the option they chose for each 
of the 10 lottery decisions.  After all participants had made their decisions, each subject had to 
throw a ten-sided die twice: once to select the decision to be considered and a second time to 
determine her payoff for the option chosen, A or B.  
All the transactions, except the lottery, were conducted in points, with conversion into Euros 
at a rate of 80 points = €1.  Payment consisted of the sum of payoffs during each period plus 
the lottery payment and a €3 show-up fee.  On average, the subjects earned €17.40.  The 
sessions lasted approximately one hour, excluding the lottery draw and payment that was 
made in private in a separate room for confidentiality. 
 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
We first analyze the mean and the variance of effort, before studying the determinants of the 
payment scheme choice.  Last, we examine the heterogeneity in individuals’ behavior 
regarding both the choice of the tournament and the decision of effort. 
 
Mean and Variance of Effort 
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Table 1 displays summary statistics about the mean and the distribution of effort by payment 
scheme and by treatment. 
First, we check whether we observe both a higher mean and a greater variance of effort under 
the tournament than under the piece-rate pay scheme, like in the previous experiments.  In our 
Benchmark treatment, we find that the average effort is 46.48 under the piece-rate scheme and 
it is 53.28 in the tournaments.  Both numbers are significantly above the equilibrium effort 
levels (39 and 48, respectively; t-test, p=0.000).  As predicted by the model, the agents exert 
more effort in a competitive setting (Mann-Whitney U test, p=0.000).  As regards the variance 
of effort, our results corroborate those of previous experiments.  Averaging over all the 
periods, the total variance is 368.88 under the piece-rate scheme and 652.26 in tournaments. 
Thus, the variability of effort is clearly higher under the competitive scheme. 
Next, we turn to consider the influence on the mean and the variance of effort of the 
possibility given to the subjects to choose their payment scheme.  Table 1 and Figure 1 reveal 
a substantial increase of the average effort under the tournaments from 53.28 in the 
Benchmark treatment to 61.57 in the Choice treatment.  Interestingly, average effort also 
increases from 46.48 in the Benchmark to 50.45 for the agents who choose to be paid a piece-
rate.  As a consequence, the differences relative to the equilibrium effort values are even larger 
when agents self-select.  As for the tournaments, we note that while the subjects on average 
play the equilibrium effort in the last four periods in the Benchmark treatment, this behavior 
cannot be observed in the Choice treatment although there is a slight decline in effort over 
time.  The choice of the payment scheme is associated with a slower convergence to 
equilibrium. 
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Table 1 and Figure 2 also show a dramatic change in the variability of effort when agents self-
select.  Comparing the Benchmark with the Choice treatment, we find that the variance under 
the piece-rate diminishes from 368.88 to 227.87 (-38.23 per cent) and the variance in the 
tournament decreases from 652.26 to 258.19 (-60.42 per cent).  Not only is the variability of 
effort lower when agents self-select, but now the tournament cannot be considered as being 
more unstable than the piece-rate.  Levene’s robust test statistic rejects the hypothesis of 
equality of variance between the tournament and the piece-rate in the Benchmark treatment 
(z=48.929, p<0.000) but accepts it in the Choice treatment (z=0.135). 
Figure 2 displays the dispersion of effort in tournaments in each treatment.  The distribution of 
effort in tournaments in the Choice treatment is characterized by the following.  The median 
(indicated by the horizontal line) is slightly higher than in the benchmark.  The distribution of 
effort (given by the quartiles, the grey bars) is more concentrated around the median when 
agents can self-select, whereas effort is more dispersed below the median when they cannot. 
The adjacent values (the vertical lines) are closer to the median, meaning in particular that 
contestants chose a zero effort less often (7 observations out of 564) than in the Benchmark 
treatment (45 observations out of 600). 
The variability of effort across the game may be explained by both a time-varying behavior 
(learning dimension) and time-invariant inter-individual characteristics (heterogeneity 
dimension).  To gauge the relative importance of these two dimensions, in Table 2 we 
decompose the variance into its within and between components.   
The between-subject variance of effort in tournaments accounts for two thirds of the total 
variance in the Benchmark treatment.  It is four times lower and it accounts for less than 40% 
of the total variance in the Choice treatment.
vii
  Consequently, when people self-select, the 
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population of voluntary contestants is more homogeneous in terms of exerted effort and the 
variability of effort is mainly due to an intra-individual component.  The within-subject 
variance of effort in tournaments shows that in the Choice treatment, the variability of effort is 
lower than in the Benchmark: the subjects learn less or they are less hesitant.  Similar 
differences in the between-subject and within-subject variances are observed for the piece-rate 
scheme: both are lower when subjects can self-select. 
Would we also observe a decrease in the variance of effort if the subjects were allowed to 
choose which incentive scheme they prefer only once at the beginning of the game and for its 
whole duration instead of choosing each period?  In such an environment, the selection 
decision is more constraining since the subject cannot switch during the session.  To answer 
this question and to carry out a robustness test, we have designed an additional treatment (the 
Single-Choice treatment) that replicates the Benchmark treatment, except that at the beginning 
of the first period, each subject must choose between the piece-rate payment scheme and the 
tournament for the whole duration of the session.  To be consistent with the previous 
treatments, we have kept a stranger matching protocol.  The theoretical predictions remain the 
same.  We have implemented this treatment in one session involving 20 participants.
viii
 
The results of this additional treatment confirm that introducing self-selection reduces the 
variance of effort in both schemes.  Indeed, in the Single-Choice treatment, the variance under 
the piece-rate is 270.79, which is 26.59 per cent below its level in the Benchmark treatment 
(368.88), and 18.84 per cent higher than in the Choice treatment (227.87).  Similarly, in this 
new treatment the variance in the tournament is 327.11, which is 49.85 per cent lower than in 
the Benchmark (652.26) and 26.69 per cent higher than in the Choice treatment (258.19).  
Levene’s robust test statistic does not reject the hypothesis of equality of variance between the 
tournament and the piece-rate in the Single-Choice treatment (z=2.570).  In addition, whereas 
 18 
the between-subject variance represents 66.63 per cent of the total variance of effort in 
tournaments when no self-selection is allowed and 39.43 per cent in the Choice treatment, the 
corresponding percentage in the Single-Choice treatment is only 24.67 per cent.  We conclude 
from this additional treatment that allowing people who dislike competition to opt out 
contributes significantly to the reduction of the variance in tournaments and to a greater 
homogeneity of contestants, also when the choice is made once and for all future periods.   
The descriptive statistics shown above refer to averages.  Next, we account for individual 
characteristics and for the longitudinal character of the data.  Table 3 gives the results of 
random-effects Tobit regressions of the effort decisions, accounting for the censoring of the 
observations.  The results for the Benchmark treatment and the Choice treatment are displayed 
in the first and the second column, respectively.  The independent variables include a time 
trend to capture learning, a payment scheme dummy to capture the impact of competition, the 
random shock in the previous period and individual characteristics (the degree of risk aversion 
and gender).  The risk aversion variable (coded from 1 to 10) corresponds to the number of the 
decision where the subject crosses over from the safer to the riskier option in the lottery test: 
the higher this number, the more risk averse the subject. 
 The two treatments have several common determinants of effort.  Other things equal, effort 
declines over time.  Competition stimulates performance; the coefficient is larger in the 
Choice treatment than in the Benchmark treatment.  Although it is common knowledge that 
the periods are independent, the subjects adjust their effort downwards (upwards) when they 
have received a positive (negative) random shock in the previous period.  Alternative 
regressions (not reported here) in which the time trend has been omitted lead to the same 
conclusions (i.e., there is no multicollinearity between the time trend and the lagged random 
number).  The main difference between the two treatments is related to the influence of risk 
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aversion.  Risk aversion has a significant negative impact on effort when the payment schemes 
are imposed on the subjects: considering the uncertainty of the environment, risk-averse 
subjects reduce their cost of effort.  This variable is not significant in the Choice treatment, 
suggesting that risk aversion plays a role in the sorting process, but not once the choice has 
been made.  It is therefore important to understand what determines sorting. 
Sorting 
In the Choice treatment, the competitive scheme is chosen in 50 per cent of the cases.  Its 
relative frequency declines slightly from 52.67 per cent in the first ten periods to 47.33 per 
cent in the subsequent ten periods.
ix
  This corresponds to the theoretical prediction since the 
expected utility in the tournament and the piece-rate scheme is the same.    
Figure 3 displays the evolution of the frequency of the tournament choice over time.  
Contestants have been grouped into three categories: subjects who choose the tournament in at 
least 14 out of 20 periods (“tournament +”), subjects who choose the tournament in 6 periods 
or less (“tournament -“), and an intermediate category (“tournament =”).  We find that the 
frequent competitors are relatively stable in their choices around a slightly increasing time 
trend.  The least frequent users have chosen the tournament less often than other subjects since 
the very beginning of the game; moreover, after period 4, their frequency of tournament 
choice drops dramatically and remains at a very low level until the end of the game.  Last, the 
intermediate category is the most unstable one, with a large oscillation of the frequency of the 
tournament choice from one set of periods to the next.  We do not find any evidence of a 
selection strategy consisting of playing safer at the beginning of the game by choosing the 
piece-rate to secure a certain level of payoff, before switching to the riskier tournament 
scheme in the second part of the game. 
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If the tournament is selected in 50 per cent of the cases, does it mean that subjects choose at 
random their payment scheme or can we identify characteristics of subjects that predict their 
behavior?  
A natural candidate for a determinant of sorting is risk aversion.  Table 4 compares the 
distribution of our subjects in terms of risk attitude to the results in Holt and Laury (2002).  
We observe higher proportions of risk lovers and more than slightly risk averse subjects than 
in Holt and Laury’s pool of subjects, but the differences are small.  A Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
exact test does not reject the hypothesis of equality of distribution functions between our 
Benchmark and Choice treatments. 
Figure 4 relates the frequency of our subjects’ tournament choices to their proportion of safe 
choices in the ten decisions of the lottery task.  Again, we consider the three categories of 
contestants as defined above (Tournament +, Tournament =, and Tournament -).  The dashed 
line corresponds to the behavior of a risk neutral agent switching from option A to option B at 
decision 5.  
Clearly, the subjects who choose the tournament less frequently are more risk averse than the 
other categories.
x
  All risk averse subjects considered together (who made at least 5 safe 
lottery choices) choose the tournament in 45.50 per cent of the periods, whereas the 
corresponding proportions are 60.38 per cent for the risk neutral subjects and 56.4 per cent for 
the risk lovers.  A Poisson count model of the total number of tournaments chosen by the 
subject throughout the session has been estimated, including individual characteristics.  It 
shows that only risk aversion exerts a significant influence and its marginal effect is important: 
crossing over from the safer to the riskier option one decision later in the lottery choices 
reduces by 77.80 per cent the number of tournament choices.  
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We have also conducted an econometric analysis of the choice of the tournament scheme, the 
results of which are reported in Table 5.  Regression (1) estimates a random-effects Probit 
model, and regression (2) a fixed-effects Logit model .
xi
 
This analysis confirms that the degree of risk aversion is an important determinant of the 
choice of the competitive scheme. The tournament choice is also affected by previous 
outcomes.  The regression shows that it declines over time and that bad luck in the previous 
period increases the probability to compete.  This may reflect the subjects’ attempts to get the 
winner’s prize to compensate for small earnings in the previous period.  Lastly, descriptive 
statistics indicate that if 72.86 per cent of those who won a tournament in the previous period 
choose to remain in the competitive scheme, this percentage decreases to 58.36 per cent 
among those who lost the previous competition. 
Overall, these results suggest that risk aversion may be an important determinant of 
occupational choices.  They are consistent with the survey analysis by Bonin et al. (2006) 
carried out on German data, which shows that risk averse employees tend to concentrate in 
jobs with low earnings risks.  In contrast to Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Datta Gupta et 
al. (2005), we do not find evidence of a gender difference in competitiveness. 
Heterogeneity of Behavior in Tournaments 
We investigate the behavioral origins of the reduction of effort variability when individuals 
self-select into tournaments by adopting a cluster analysis that helps in identifying different 
types of behavior.  In order to partition the sample, we retain three variables that summarize 
each individual’s decisions: her frequency of tournament choices, her mean effort in the 
tournament and its standard deviation.  In the Benchmark treatment, we only consider the last 
two variables.  We apply the hierarchical Wald method based on the minimization of the intra-
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group variance to identify the clusters that sum up the strategies.  Clusters have been grouped 
so that the smallest one includes at least 10% of the subjects.   
In both treatments, four main categories of tournament players are identified displaying 
similar characteristics; therefore we use the same denomination of clusters.  The so-called 
“underconfident competitors” are subjects who exert an excessively high level of effort (more 
than 50% above the equilibrium), with relatively low standard deviation.  The “motivated 
competitors” are subjects who exert a level of effort still higher than the equilibrium but closer 
to it.  The “hesitant competitors” group consists of subjects who alternate levels of effort 
below and above the equilibrium and are characterized by the highest standard deviation of 
effort.  Lastly, “economizing competitors” are subjects who follow a stable strategy based on 
the choice of a level of effort below the equilibrium. 
Table 6 summarizes the statistics that characterize these behaviors in each treatment.  The first 
column indicates the proportion of each cluster in the population.  The second column 
represents the relative frequency with which the tournament has been played during the 
session.  The following columns give the mean individual effort and within-individual 
standard deviation of effort in the tournament.  The last column gives the between-subject 
standard deviation within each cluster. 
In the Choice treatment, the analysis identifies two main categories of subjects according to 
their frequency of tournament choice.  Frequent competitors, who compete in at least half of 
the periods, are characterized by a lower within-subject variance of effort than the occasional 
competitors, who choose the tournament in about one third of the periods. 
When they can select their payment scheme, the individuals who enter more frequently into 
the tournament are both the motivated and the economizing competitors.  The group of 
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motivated competitors is very homogenous as indicated by the low between-subject deviation. 
The relative importance of this group (40% of all the subjects involved in this treatment) 
contributes to explain the lower variance of effort in tournaments when individuals can self-
select.  In contrast, the group of economizing competitors shows the lowest within-subject and 
the highest between-subject variance of effort.  It includes subjects who choose a minimum 
cost but can expect to win the tournament by chance.  It also includes subjects who exert a 
level of effort slightly below equilibrium, possibly due to overconfidence or perception biases 
with respect to uncertainty, such as misconceptions of chance [Kahneman, Slovic, and 
Tversky (1982)] or illusion of control over external events originated in being given a choice 
as studied by Langer (1975).
xii
  Whatever the explanation, their low-cost choices enable them 
to earn more on average than the motivated competitors (45.85 and 42.73, respectively). 
The hesitant and the under-confident subjects are occasional competitors.  The high within-
subject variance of effort of the first group suggests that, facing the strategic uncertainty 
attached to the tournament, these subjects make errors both above and below the equilibrium. 
Entering the tournament less often reinforces the difficulties of learning the equilibrium. 
Consequently, they earn less on average in the tournament than the frequent competitors 
(40.80 points).  The group of under-confident competitors is also not able to compute the 
equilibrium but always exerts a very high level of average effort in tournaments (73.20, i.e. 
52.50 per cent above the equilibrium).  As a consequence, even if they win relatively often the 
competition, the cost of effort is too high and thus they earn considerably less on average than 
under the piece-rate scheme (36.06 and 50.60 points, respectively). 
The comparison of treatments indicates that the reduction of the effort variability in 
tournaments when agents can self-select is due to the fact that the most extreme categories in 
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terms of average effort and the most unstable agents tend to stay out of the competition.  The 
experiment points to a potential limitation of sorting.  The motivated competitors provide an 
over-supply of effort and their net earnings are not very high.  These subjects do not enter into 
a rat race (that is, effort does not increase over time), but nevertheless, sorting reinforces a 
tendency to exert excess effort from some employees.  A potential explanation of this 
observation is that in the Choice treatment subjects who have chosen to compete know that 
they are likely to face other subjects who are also eager to win. 
 
V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In a one-shot game environment, our results confirm that both the average level and the 
variance of effort are higher under a tournament than under a piece-rate payment scheme.  
This higher variability of effort has long been considered an important disadvantage since the 
employers have to bear uncertainty as to how the agents behave in relative performance 
compensation schemes. However, by analyzing an experimental setting that accounts for a key 
feature of markets, that the agents can choose their payment scheme repeatedly, our results 
paint a fundamentally different picture.  A major finding of this paper is that when the subjects 
enter the tournament voluntarily, the average effort is higher and the variance of effort is 
substantially lower compared to situations in which the same payment scheme is imposed.  
In our experiment, average effort in the freely chosen tournament is 32.47 per cent higher than 
in the exogenously imposed piece-rate scheme.  This differential can be decomposed into an 
incentive and a sorting effect.  The difference between effort levels in the imposed piece-rate 
and in the imposed tournament is an estimate of the incentive effect of tournaments: here, this 
is of the magnitude of a 14.63 per cent increase in effort.  The difference of 17.84 per cent 
between the total increase in effort and the estimated incentive effect can be attributed to the 
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sorting effect of tournaments.  The sorting effect makes up a little more than half of the total 
increase in effort; this is comparable to Lazear’s (2000) corresponding estimates in connection 
with the switch from a fixed pay to a variable pay scheme.  This confirms the importance of 
taking sorting into account when evaluating the efficiency of compensation schemes.  
Another important and new result is that sorting significantly decreases the variance of effort 
in tournaments.  When agents freely enter the tournament, the between-subject variance is four 
times (and even five times in the Single-Choice treatment) smaller than when this scheme is 
imposed and it is even lower than the variance of effort under an imposed piece-rate scheme. 
It is worth noting that we obtain this result in spite of the increased complexity of the task to 
be performed as compared to previous studies.  Consequently, our experiment does not lead to 
the same recommendations as Bull et al. (1987), who suggest that to attract contestants, an 
employer should offer them a higher expected utility than under a piece-rate scheme.  Our 
conclusion is rather that labor market flexibility, in particular the absence of restrictions on 
mobility between firms, is a key condition for a higher efficiency of relative performance pay.  
Our results indicate that the efficiency-enhancing effect of sorting derives from the resulting 
greater homogeneity of contestants.  In the Choice treatment, we have seen that since 
tournaments involve higher uncertainty than the piece-rate scheme, risk averse subjects choose 
them to a lesser extent.  Under-confident subjects also prefer the piece-rate scheme since they 
exert too much effort in the tournament, entailing an excessive cost of effort.  Hesitant 
subjects, alternating between above and below equilibrium effort levels, are not attracted by 
the tournament either.  On the other hand, individuals who are motivated to work hard do not 
hesitate to choose the tournament in which equilibrium effort is higher.  Among frequent 
contestants, the motivated competitors represent the biggest and the most stable category.  
Thus, the homogeneity of the contestants is higher when the tournament is chosen and this 
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contributes to the lower variance of effort.  More homogeneity does not, however, give rise to 
collusion.  Our interpretation is that these motivated subjects anticipate that they will face 
other subjects who like themselves are eager to win, too.   Beyond this, our results suggest that 
introducing more competitive payment schemes in some occupations would sort employees 
and that the attitude toward risk may be an important driver of mobility between firms or 
sectors. 
Having demonstrated that sorting has profound implications for the level and variance of 
effort in tournaments, we think further work should focus on how sorting is affected both by 
the prize structure and by differences in individuals’ skills and social preferences: if people 
care about the negative externalities imposed on others by their individual effort, they may try 
not only to reduce their level of effort in relative pay schemes [Bandiera, Barankay, and Rasul 
(2005)], but also to stay out of a competition.  Our work suggests more generally the 
importance of reconsidering the influence of sorting in many economic decisions. 
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i
 Survey data analyses include Bognanno  (2001), Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990b), Eriksson 
(1999), Knoeber and Thurman (1994), Main, O'Reilly III, and Wade (1993), and experiments 
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include Bull, Schotter, and Weigelt (1987), Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003), Nalbantian and 
Schotter (1997), Orrison, Schotter, and Weigelt (2004), Schotter and Weigelt (1992). 
ii
 In the Safelite study by Lazear (2000), half of the productivity gain associated with the 
introduction of variable pay is attributed to its ability to sort the most skilled employees.  
Experimental tests include Cadsby, Song, and Tapon (2007), and Eriksson and Villeval  
(2004), on sorting and incentives; Lazear, Malmendier, and Weber (2005) on sorting and 
social preferences; Bohnet and Kübler  (2005) on sorting and cooperation. 
iii
 In the theoretical literature, Fullerton and McAfee (1999) propose an auction design in order 
to limit the entry into tournaments to selected highly qualified contestants.  Hvide and 
Kristiansen (2003) show, however, that improving the quality of the contestants pool does not 
necessarily increase the selection efficiency of tournaments.  In the empirical literature, 
Ehrenberg and Bognanno (1990a) show that higher winners’ prizes attract better players and 
Knoeber and Thurman (1994) propose setting minimum standards to get rid of the poor 
performing competitors.  Niederle and Vesterlund (2007) and Datta Gupta, Poulsen, and 
Villeval (2005) identify the importance of gender in the ex ante sorting effect of tournaments.  
Bonin, Dohmen, Falk, Huffman, and Sunde (2006) use survey data and show that risk averse 
individuals are more likely to be sorted into occupations with low earnings risk.  In a field 
experiment, Bellemare and Shearer (2006) show that a firm that uses high-intensity incentive 
contracts and operate in a risky environment attracts more risk-tolerant individuals than other 
firms.  Dohmen and Falk (2006) observe that risk averse subjects prefer fixed payments over 
piece-rate or tournament schemes and that tournaments attract subjects with different 
personalities, abilities, self-assessment and preferences than the other payment schemes. 
iv
 In this design, s is assumed to be similar for all agents, for the sake of simplicity. 
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v
 We took care of using similar pools of subjects in both treatments.  The average age of the 
subjects is 20.95 in the Benchmark treatment and 20.92 years in the Choice treatment; the 
average safety indexes are 5.30 and 5.35 respectively; Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests indicate that 
the distribution of age and safety index are not different between treatments.  The proportion 
of men is 45 per cent in the Benchmark and 46.67 per cent in the Choice treatment.  A 
Wilcoxon test accepts the equality between treatments. 
vi
 Regarding the first possible effect, Bull, Schotter and Weigelt (1987) reject the errors in 
inference explanation of the variance: in fixed pairs, giving the subjects a feedback on the 
effort chosen by their opponent does increase the variance of effort in comparison with 
situations in which the subjects are only informed about their rank or on the total outcome.   
Regarding the second and opposite effect, Harbring and Irlenbusch (2003) observe opposite 
strategies between pairs in a game where both the minimum and the maximum effort levels 
are two equilibria in pure strategies.  There is, however, no reason to observe this multiple 
convention outcome when the game has a unique interior equilibrium as in our game.  In 
addition, Bull et al. (1987) mention that the high variance they observe with an interior 
equilibrium is not due to outlier pairs and that there is no tendency for variance to decline as 
the experiment progresses, which should be the case if the formation of conventions was at 
stake.  
vii
 If we remove the observations with a level of effort of 0 or 100 (73 and 41, respectively), 
the between-subject variance in the tournament still represents 64.43 per cent (270.60/419.96) 
of the total variance in the Benchmark and 42.04 per cent (76.12/181.05) in the Choice 
treatment. Thus the structure of the variance remains the same as when all the contestants are 
considered. 
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viii
 Since an uneven number of participants chose the tournament (11), one of them has been 
randomly drawn and informed that he would be paid according to the piece-rate scheme. 
ix 
 The proportion of subjects choosing the tournament was 55 per cent in the Single Choice 
treatment.  
 
x
 We checked that although made at the end of the sessions, the lottery decisions do not result 
from the behavior in the main game instead of explaining it. In fact, there is no correlation 
between the number of safe choices in the lotteries and the individual’s net payoff.  
xi
 We also tested a two-step selection model with random effects, including the treatment 
variable in the non-selection equation and the inverse of the Mill’s ratio, fitted by simulated 
maximum likelihood.  The selection equation included risk aversion, gender, the lagged 
random shock and a time trend.  The analysis concludes to the absence of any selection bias, 
so that we can proceed with separate equations. 
xii
 In the first period of the game, after the subjects have chosen their level of effort, we asked 
them: « How big do you estimate your chances are that you will draw a random number that 
increases your payoff? ». 14.17 percent reported a probability lower than 0.49 and 13.33 
percent a probability exceeding 0.50.  61.11 percent of the optimistic subjects opted for the 
tournament, whereas the corresponding percentages are 47.31 for the pessimistic and 48.29 for 
the well-calibrated subjects.  According to a Probit regression (not shown) including only the 
first period data and individual observable characteristics, optimism marginally but 
significantly (at the 10 per cent level) increases tournament entry.  If all periods are 
considered, miscalibration is no longer significant since subjective beliefs are revised 
throughout the game. 
 TABLE 1 
Summary statistics on average level and variance of effort 
 
 Average effort Mean variance of effort 
Periods All 1 1-10 11-20 All 1 1-10 11-20 
Piece-rate  
  Benchmark t. 
  Choice t. 
46.48 
50.45 
55.73 
47.63 
48.92 
51.35 
44.04 
49.63 
  368.88 
  227.87 
388.06 
192.37 
381.29 
228.34 
345.73 
226.70 
Tournament         
  Benchmark t. 
  Choice t. 
53.28 
61.57 
60.03 
65.75 
55.62 
63.37 
50.94 
59.55 
  652.26 
  258.19 
663.76 
319.38 
672.51 
239.59 
623.19 
272.30 
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TABLE 2 
Decomposition of the variance of effort 
Variance Between-subject Within-subject Total 
Benchmark treatment 
Piece-rate 
Tournament 
 
193.69 (52.51) 
       434.55 (66.62) 
 
175.19 (47.49) 
       217.71 (33.38) 
 
368.88 (100) 
       652.26 (100) 
Choice treatment 
Piece-rate 
Tournament 
 
       120.01 (52.67) 
       101.79 (39.42) 
 
      107.86 (47.33) 
      156.41 (60.58) 
 
       227.87 (100) 
       258.19 (100) 
Note: Percentages of the total variance in parentheses. 
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 TABLE 3 
Determinants of the effort decision 
 
                                                      Random-effects Tobit regressions  
Treatments Benchmark (1) Choice (2) 
Time trend 
 
Payment scheme 
(Tournament=1) 
Lagged random shock 
 
Risk aversion 
 
Gender (male=1) 
 
Constant 
-0.495*** 
(0.079) 
3.377** 
(1.537) 
-0.048*** 
(0.018) 
-2.908*** 
(0.452) 
-7.518*** 
(1.411) 
71.877*** 
(3.083) 
-0.305*** 
(0.071) 
11.554*** 
(0.859) 
-0.035** 
(0.017) 
-0.361 
(0.474) 
-4.377*** 
(1.346) 
56.718*** 
(3.027) 
Nb obs. 
Left censored obs. 
Right censored obs. 
Log likelihood 
Wald 2 
Prob>2 
1140 
63 
20 
-4478.911 
124.97 
0.000 
1140 
8 
15 
-4576.915 
227.34 
0.000 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, * at the 10% level. 
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TABLE 4 
Distribution of risk attitudes 
 
Number of  
safe choices 
Holt and Laury’s 
classification 
Holt and 
Laury’s 
experiment 
Our experiment 
Benchmark T. Choice T. 
0-1 Highly Risk Lover 0.01 0.05 0.00 
2 Very Risk Lover 0.01 0.00 0.02 
3 Risk Lover 0.06 0.05 0.10 
4 Risk Neutral 0.26 0.18 0.22 
5 Slightly Risk Averse 0.26 0.18 0.15 
6 Risk Averse 0.23 0.32 0.30 
7 Very Risk Averse 0.13 0.17 0.17 
8 Highly Risk Averse 0.03 0.03 0.03 
9-10 Stay in Bed 0.01 0.02 0.02 
 
Note: The number of safe choices corresponds to the number of the decisions with the “safe” option A, and thus 
corresponds to the “risk aversion” variable in our econometric analysis. 
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TABLE 5 
Determinants of the tournament choice 
 
 Random-effects  
Probit regression (1)  
Fixed-effects  
Logit regression (2) 
Time trend 
 
Lagged random shock 
 
Risk aversion 
 
Gender 
 
Constant 
-0.017** 
(0.007) 
-0.003* 
(0.002) 
-0.162** 
(0.066) 
-0.046 
(0.202) 
1.047*** 
(0.386) 
-0.029** 
(0.012) 
-0.005* 
(0.003) 
 
 
Nb observations 
Wald 2 / LR  2 
Prob>2 
Log Likelihood 
1140 
13.92 
0.007 
-691.202 
1102 
8.60 
0.014 
-517.065 
Note: standard errors in parentheses; *** significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. In the 
conditional fixed-effects logistic regression, the number of observations is lower than in the random-effects 
model because individuals have been dropped due to all positive or all negative outcomes. 
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TABLE 6 
Behavior in tournaments 
 
 Share in the 
population 
Relative 
frequency 
Mean effort Within-
subjects SD 
Between-
subjects SD 
Benchmark treatment 
Under-confident Competitors 30.00 100 74.48   6.35 4.20 
Motivated Competitors 30.00 100 59.93 10.78 5.37 
Hesitant Competitors 30.00 100 40.66 20.48 7.09 
Economizing Competitors 10.00 100  7.60   9.96 7.14 
      
Choice treatment      
Frequent competitors 
Motivated Competitors 40.00 57.90 61.87 9.45 3.73 
Economizing Competitors 18.33 50.90 44.56 7.60       15.55 
Occasional competitors 
Hesitant Competitors 10.00 35.80 53.06 32.61 6.48 
Under-confident Competitors 31.67 34.45 73.20 10.74 6.34 
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution of the effort decisions by treatment and by mode of payment over time 
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FIGURE 2 
 Dispersion of effort in the tournaments by treatment and category of periods 
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FIGURE 3 
 Evolution of the frequency of the tournament choice over time by category of subjects 
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FIGURE 4 
Proportion of safe lottery choices and frequency of the tournament choices 
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Appendix. Instructions of the Choice Treatment 
You are about to participate in an experiment on decision-making organized for the GATE research institute and 
the Aarhus School of Business in Denmark. During this session, you can earn money. The amount of your 
earnings depends on your decisions and on the decisions of the participants you will have interacted with. During 
the session, your earnings will be calculated in points,  
with 80 points = 1Euro 
During the session, losses are possible. However, they can be avoided with certainty by your decisions. In 
addition, if a loss would occur in a period, the gains realized during the other periods should compensate this loss. 
At the end of the session, all the profits you have made in each period will be added up and converted into Euros. 
In addition, you will receive a show-up fee of 3 Euros. You will have also an opportunity to earn additional 
money by participating in a decision task at the end of the session. Your earnings will be paid to you in cash in a 
separate room in order to preserve confidentiality. 
The session consists of 20 independent periods. 
___________ 
Description of each period 
Each period consists of two stages. 
 In stage 1, you choose between two modes of payment, mode X and mode Y. 
 
 In stage 2, you carry out a task. 
 
Your profit during each period depends on the mode of payment you have chosen and on your result from the 
task. 
 
Description of the task 
 
o A table is attached to these instructions: numbers, from 0 to 100, are given in column A. In the second stage 
of each period, your task consists of selecting one of these numbers. This number will be called your 
“decision number”. Associated with each number is a cost, called “decision cost”. These decision costs are 
listed in column B. Note that the higher the decision number chosen, the greater is the associated cost. You 
make your choice by means of a scrollbar on your computer screen and you confirm this choice by clicking 
the “OK” button.  
o Then, you have to click a button on your screen that will generate a random number. This number is called 
your “personal random draw number”. This number can take any value between – 40 and + 40. Each number 
between – 40 and + 40  is as likely to be drawn and there is one independent random draw between – 40 and 
+ 40 for  each subject in the lab. 
Your “result” for the task is the sum of your decision number and your personal random draw number.  
Your result = your decision number + your personal random draw number 
 
Choice of the mode of payment and calculation of your payoff  
There are two different modes of payment, mode X and mode Y. In the first stage of each period, you choose to 
be paid according to mode X or to mode Y. If you like, you can change the mode of payment at each new period. 
 Description of mode of payment X 
If you choose the mode of payment X, your result is multiplied by 0.52.  You also receive a fixed amount of 45 
points. Next, the decision cost associated to the choice of your decision number is subtracted. Note, the amount 
subtracted (your decision cost) is only a function of your decision number; that is, your personal random draw 
number does not affect the amount subtracted. 
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Your payoff thus depends on your decision number and your personal random draw number. Your net payoff 
under mode X is thus given by the following formula: 
 
Your net payoff of the period under mode X = 
45 + (your result * 0.52) –  your decision cost 
At the end of the period, you are informed about your result and about your net payoff for the current period. 
 
Example of net payoff calculation under mode of payment X 
For example, say that you choose a decision number of 55 and you draw a personal random number of 10. Your 
net payoff calculation will look like: 
45 + [(55 + 10) * 0.52] – 20.17 = 58.63 
 
 Description of mode of payment Y 
If you choose the mode of payment Y, another subject in the room, who has also chosen the mode of payment Y, 
is paired with you at random for the current period. This subject is called your “pair member”. The identity of 
your pair member will never be revealed to you. 
Your pair member has an identical sheet as yours. Like you and simultaneously, he has to select a decision 
number and he will draw his personal random number. As for you, the “result” of your pair member is computed 
by adding his decision number and his personal random draw number. 
Then, the computer program will compare your result and the result of your pair member.  
- If your result is greater than your pair member’s result, you receive the fixed payment M, equal to 96 
points. 
- If your result is lower than your pair member’s result, you receive the fixed payment L, equal to 45 
points. 
- In case of equal results, a fair random move decides on which subject receives M and who receives L.  
Whether you receive M or L as your fixed payment depends only on whether your result is greater or not than 
your pair member’s. It does not depend on how much bigger it is. 
To determine your net payoff, the decision cost associated with the choice of your decision number is subtracted. 
Note, the amount subtracted is only a function of your decision number; that is, your personal random draw 
number does not affect the amount subtracted. 
Therefore, your net payoff depends on your decision number, your personal random draw number, and your pair 
member’s decision number and his personal random draw number. 
 
Your net payoff under mode Y is given by the following formula: 
Your net payoff of the period under mode of payment Y =  
 Fixed payment (M or L)  – your decision cost 
At the end of the period, you are informed about your result; you are told by how much your total is greater or 
less than that of your pair member and you are informed about your net payoff for the current period.  
Example of net  payoff calculation under mode of payment Y 
For example, say that pair member A chooses a decision number of 25 and draws a personal random number of  
20, while pair member B selects a decision number of 55 and draws a personal random number of -5.  
A’s result is: 25 + 20= 45 
B’s result is: 55  -  5= 50 
B’s result is larger than A’s result. Thus, B receives M (=96) and A receives L (=45). 
A’s net payoff  is: 45 – 4.17 = 40.83 
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B’s net payoff is: 96 – 20.17 = 75.83 
To sum up, in each period you make two decisions: 
 
- In stage 1, you choose between mode of payment X and mode of payment Y. Note that if an uneven 
number of participants has chosen mode Y, one of these participants will be randomly chosen and paid 
according to mode X. To be paid according to mode Y, pairs must be formed. This participant will be 
informed of this before moving to stage 2.  
 
- In stage 2, you select your decision number and you draw a personal random number. Your net payoffs 
for the current period are then computed. 
 
At the end of a period, a new period starts automatically. Each period is independent. The random draws are 
independent from one period to the next. In each period, under mode of payment Y, pairs are composed at 
random among the participants who have chosen this mode of payment.  
----------------- 
If you have any question regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. Your questions will be answered in 
private. Throughout the entire session, talking is not allowed. Any violation of this rule will result in being 
excluded from the session and not receiving payment. 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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Decision Costs Table 
 
 
Column A 
Decision Nb 
Column B 
Cost of Decision 
Column A 
Decision Nb 
Column B 
Cost of Decision 
Column A 
Decision Nb 
Column B 
Cost of Decision 
0 0.00 35 8.17 70 32.67 
1 0.01 36 8.64 71 33.61 
2 0.03 37 9.13 72 34.56 
3 0.06 38 9.63 73 35.53 
4 0 .11 39 10.14 74 36.51 
5 0.17 40 10.67 75 37.50 
6 0.24 41 11.21 76 38.51 
7 0.33 42 11.76 77 39.53 
8 0.43 43 12.33 78 40.56 
9 0.54 44 12.91 79 41.61 
10 0.67 45 13.50 80 42.67 
11 0.81 46 14.11 81 43.74 
12 0.96 47 14.73 82 44.83 
13 1.13 48 15.36 83 45.93 
14 1.31 49 16.01 84 47.04 
15 1.50 50 16.67 85 48.17 
16 1.71 51 17.34 86 49.31 
17 1.93 52 18.03 87 50.46 
18 2.16 53 18.73 88 51.63 
19 2.41 54 19.44 89 52.81 
20 2.67 55 20.17 90 54.00 
21 2.94 56 20.91 91 55.21 
22 3.23 57 21.66 92 56.43 
23 3.53 58 22.43 93 57.66 
24 3.84 59 23.21 94 58.91 
25 4.17 60 24.00 95 60.17 
26 4.51 61 24.81 96 61.44 
27 4.86 62 25.63 97 62.73 
28 5.23 63 26.46 98 64.03 
29 5.61 64 27.31 99 65.34 
30 6.00 65 28.17 100 66,67 
31 6.41 66 29.04   
32 6.83 67 29.93   
33 7.26 68 30.83   
34 7.71 69 31.74   
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Post experimental questionnaire  
[Instructions for the test of risk aversion directly taken from Holt and Laury, 2002 ] 
 
We thank you for filling out this form that enables you to earn additional money. The attached sheet of paper 
shows ten decisions. Each decision is a paired choice between “Option A” and “Option B”. You will make ten 
choices and record these in the column on the right, but only one of them will be used in the end to determine 
your additional earnings. Let us explain how these choices will affect your earnings. 
Here is a ten-sided die that will be used to determine this payoff. The faces are numbered from 1 to 10 (the “0” 
face of the die will serve as 10). After you have made all of your choices, and when you come to the other office 
to receive your payment, you will throw this die twice:  
- once to select one of the ten decisions to be used,  
- and a second time to determine what your payoff is for the option you chose, A or B, for the particular 
decision selected.  
 
Even though we ask you to make ten decisions, only one of these will end up affecting your earnings. However, 
you will not know in advance which decision will be used. Obviously, each decision has an equal chance of being 
used in the end. 
 
 Look at Decision 1.  
Option A pays 2 € if the throw of the dice is 1, and it pays 1.6 € if the throw is 2-10.  
Option B yields 3.85 € if the throw of the dice is 1 and it pays 0.1 € if the throw is 2-10.   
 
 Look at Decision 2.  
Option A pays 2 € if the throw of the dice is 1 or 2, and it pays 1.6 € if the throw is 3-10.  
Option B yields 3.85 € if the throw of the dice is 1 or 2 and it pays 0.1 € if the throw is 3-10.   
 
The other decisions are similar, except that as you move down the table, the chances of a higher payoff for each 
option increase.  In fact, for Decision 10 in the bottom row, the dice will not be needed since each option pays the 
highest  payoff for sure, so your choice here is between 2 € and 3.85 €. 
 
To summarize, 
- you will make ten choices. For each decision row, you will have to choose between Option A and 
Option B. You may choose A for some decision rows and B for other rows. You may change your 
decisions and make them in any order.  
 
- When you come to the other room to receive your earnings from the experiment, you will throw the ten-
sided die to select which of the ten decisions will be used.  
 
- Then, you will throw the die again to determine your money earnings for the Option you chose for that 
Decision.  
 
Earnings (in Euros) for this choice will be added to your previous earnings, and you will be paid all earnings in 
cash. 
If you have any question, please raise your hand. Your questions will be answered in private. Please do not talk 
with anyone. 
 
--------------- 
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Please indicate for each of the following 10 decisions if you choose Option A or Option B.  
 
 Your decision 
Decision 1 
Option A: 1/10 of 2 € and 9/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 1/10  of 3.85 € and 9/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A      O                    
Option B      O 
Decision 2 
Option A: 2/10 of 2 € and 8/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 2/10  of 3.85 € and 8/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                    
Option B     O 
Decision 3 
Option A: 3/10 of 2 € and 7/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 3/10  of 3.85 € and 7/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision  4 
Option A: 4/10 of 2 € and 6/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 4/10  of 3.85 € and 6/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision 5 
Option A: 5/10 of 2 € and 5/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 5/10  of 3.85 € and 5/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision 6 
Option A: 6/10 of 2 € and 4/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 6/10  of 3.85 € and 4/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision  7 
Option A: 7/10 of 2 € and 3/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 7/10  of 3.85 € and 3/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision 8 
Option A: 8/10 of 2 € and 2/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 8/10  of 3.85 € and 2/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision  9 
Option A: 9/10 of 2 € and 1/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 9/10  of 3.85 € and 1/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
Decision 10 
Option A: 10/10 of 2 € and 0/10 of 1.6 € 
Option B: 10/10  of 3.85 € and 0/10 of 0.1 € 
 
Option A     O                   
Option B     O 
 
 
 
